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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Unlike a primary confession, which is a direct admission of guilt given by a
suspect, a secondary confession is testimony given by one person about another person’s
admission of guilt (Wetmore, Neuschatz, & Gronlund, 2014). In other words, a secondary
confession occurs when one person states that he or she heard another individual confess
to a crime. Jailhouse informant testimony is a specific type of secondary confession in
which the individual claims to have heard a fellow inmate admit to a crime while the two
were incarcerated together. The purpose of the current study is to investigate the
influence of this type of secondary confession on eyewitness identification.
According to the Innocence Project, an organization dedicated to criminal justice
reform that has helped exonerate 190 wrongfully convicted individuals, of all wrongful
convictions overturned by DNA evidence, 15% were due in part to a false secondary
confession (Innocence Project, 2016). Additionally, Northwestern University Law
School’s Center on Wrongful Convictions reviewed the 111 cases of death row
exonerations that occurred between 1973 and 2004 and found that 45.9% involved a false
secondary confession, making false secondary confessions the leading cause of wrongful
capital convictions (Warden, 2004). Giving support to these statistics, a comprehensive
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investigation into the use of jailhouse informants in Los Angeles County by the Los
Angeles County Grand Jury (1990) found evidence that jailhouse informants routinely
lied under oath and that prosecutors and law enforcement used jailhouse informants that
were known to be unreliable. This information has led researchers in the psycho-legal
field to investigate the influence this testimony has on jurors and other forms of evidence
(Erickson, Lampinen, Wooten, Wetmore & Neuschatz, 2016; Neuschatz, Lawson,
Swanner, Meissner & Neuschatz, 2008; Wetmore et al., 2014).
Primary Confession Research
When discussing the research on jailhouse informants and other sources of
secondary confessions, it is useful to first describe the research on primary confessions.
In regards to the influence of primary confessions on jurors, researchers have found that
potential jurors believe false admissions of guilt to be counter-intuitive and unlikely to
occur through interrogation (Leo & Liu, 2009). Additionally, participant-jurors find
primary confessions to be more influential than other types of evidence (Kassin &
Neumann, 1997) and participant-jurors are unable to fully discount primary confession
evidence even after the judge ruled it inadmissible (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). These
findings can be explained by the fundamental attribution error (FAE). The FAE is the
tendency of individuals to attribute the behavior of others to internal states while
disregarding situational factors (Ross, 1977). In regards to primary confessions, the FAE
occurs when jurors attribute the confession to the suspect’s internal state (i.e., being
guilty and feeling remorse) while ignoring situational factors (i.e., the social pressure
involved in interrogation).
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Primary confessions not only influence jurors, but they also influence other forms
of evidence. Kassin, Bogart, and Kerner (2012) reviewed the 241 DNA exoneration
cases the Innocence Project was involved with and found that the cases involving a false
primary confession had significantly higher frequencies of additional false evidence than
did cases involving an eyewitness. Additionally, in the cases involving multiple pieces of
false evidence, primary confessions were most likely to have occurred first. These
findings suggest that false primary confessions may lead to the creation of other false
evidence, including forensic evidence, eyewitness identifications and secondary
confessions. Indeed, experimental studies have given support to this hypothesis.
Researchers have found that primary confessions can influence polygraph
examiners, handwriting evaluators, alibi witnesses and eyewitnesses. Elaad, Ginton and
Ben-Shakhar (1994) had professional polygraph examiners score and assess polygraph
records that were accompanied with a statement that either the examinee eventually
confessed to the crime or that someone else confessed. The researchers found that the
examiners, when presented with inconclusive polygraph records, correctly scored the
records as being inconclusive a majority of the time. However, the examiners scored the
records that were accompanied with a primary confession from the examinee
significantly closer to the level indicating deception than the records accompanied with a
primary confession from someone else. These findings suggest that even professionals
are not exempt from the influence of contextual information in the form of a primary
confession.
Primary confessions can also influence handwriting evaluators. Kukucka and
Kassin (2014) presented participants with pairs of handwriting samples and asked them to
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evaluate the pairs for shared authorship both before and after receiving a case summary
about an armed robbery. The case summary stated that one of the handwriting samples
came from the perpetrator and the other sample came from the suspect in question.
However, some participants read that the suspect confessed to the crime and then later
recanted the confession, while other participants read that the suspect maintained his
innocence throughout interrogation. The researchers found that those in the confession
condition significantly increased their rates of match judgments after being presented
with the case summary, whereas those who did not read of a confession did not change
their rates of match judgments. As hypothesized by the researchers, primary confession
evidence did influence the evaluations of the handwriting.
Primary confessions not only influence different forms of incriminating evidence,
but they also influence exculpatory evidence. Marion, Kukucka, Collins, Kassin and
Burke (2016) investigated how alibi witnesses are influenced by an innocent suspect’s
confession. Participants were asked to corroborate the accurate alibi of a confederate,
who the participants believed to be their partner, after the participant was told that money
had been stolen from a nearby office. After corroborating the alibi, the participants were
presented with an incident report form that stated the confederate confessed to stealing
the money and later recanted or that the confederate denied being involved in the theft.
Of the participants who heard of the confession, only 45% maintained their corroboration
(compared to 95% who heard of the denial), and this number dropped even further to
20% among participants who were told that their corroboration might suggest they had
made a deal with the confederate. These findings suggest that a confession not only can
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lead to the creation of more incriminating evidence, but can also eliminate exculpatory
evidence necessary for keeping innocent individuals from being wrongfully convicted.
A primary confession is so persuasive it can even make eyewitnesses change their
identification. In a study conducted by Hasel and Kassin (2006), participants witnessed a
live mock crime in which a laptop was stolen. After, the experimenter explained to the
participants that the theft was part of a study on criminal investigations in which the
experimenter would act as the detective and attempt to solve the crime. Participants were
then presented with a photographic lineup that did not include the thief (target-absent)
and were asked to identify the perpetrator and give a confidence rating for their
identification decision. Two days later, participants returned to the laboratory and were
told that the experimenter had reviewed all the eyewitness accounts and had interrogated
a list of predetermined suspects. Among choosers (those who identified one of the
members of the lineup as the perpetrator), the experimenter told some of the participants
that the individual they identified from the lineup confessed during the interrogation
while others were told that a particular suspect confessed, but it was not the individual
they had identified. After, participants gave another confidence rating for the
identification they made 2 days prior. Lastly, participants were presented with the same
photographic lineup and were given the chance to reconsider their previous identification.
The researchers found that the participants who were told the person they
identified confessed had an increase in their identification confidence, whereas those who
were told that another suspect confessed had a decrease in confidence. Additionally,
when participants were given the chance to reconsider their identification, 60% of those
who were told another suspect confessed changed their identification to identify the
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confessor. In this study, the primary confession testimony acted as post-identification
feedback.
Post-identification feedback is any information given to an eyewitness about their
identification after the identification has already been made (Charman, Carlucci, Vallano
& Gregory, 2010). Post-identification feedback has been studied extensively and has
been found to influence eyewitness confidence, and this influence has been coined the
post-identification feedback effect (for review, see Steblay, Wells & Douglass, 2014).
Confirming feedback is information given to an eyewitness that suggests he or she made
an accurate identification, while disconfirming feedback is information given to an
eyewitness that suggests he or she made an inaccurate identification. The influence that
confirming and disconfirming feedback has on eyewitnesses may be understood through
the Selective Cue Integration Framework (Charman et al., 2010). The Selective Cue
Integration Framework is a theoretical model used to understand how eyewitnesses
determine their confidence in regards to their identification decisions.
The Selective Cue Integration Framework proposes that confidence assessment
occurs in a three-stage cognitive process. The assessment stage is when eyewitnesses
initially begin to assess their confidence by considering the strength of their internal cues.
An example of an internal cue could be the mental image of a culprit’s face. If the image
of the culprit’s face is vivid and easily accessible, the model theorizes that the eyewitness
will quickly make their confidence assessment. However, if the mental image of the
culprit is not vivid or easily accessible, the eyewitness will move on to the next stage.
The search stage occurs next in the process, and during this stage the eyewitness searches
for external cues to determine the accuracy of their decision. Post-identification feedback
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is an example of an external cue. Once the eyewitness has found any relevant external
cues, he or she moves on to the evaluation stage. During the evaluation stage the
eyewitness looks for information that would undermine the credibility of the external
cues gathered during the search stage. If this type of information is found, the external
cues are not taken into consideration when assessing confidence. However, if no
information is found undermining the credibility of the external cues, then the external
cues are used when the eyewitness assesses his or her confidence. Based on this
theoretical model, eyewitnesses who have a weak memory of the crime will use presented
feedback to assess their confidence if that feedback is thought to be credible (Charman et
al., 2010).
Secondary Confessions and Jury Decision-Making
Primary and secondary confessions are not only similar in name and definition,
but they are also similarly influential on mock juries (Wetmore et al., 2014). Neuschatz et
al. (2008) found that testimony from a jailhouse informant led to increased conviction
rates among participant-jurors. This was true even in the presence of an expert witness
suggesting the unreliable nature of secondary confessions or information stating that the
jailhouse informant had testified in 20 other cases (Neuschatz et al., 2012). Additionally,
Wetmore et al. (2014) found that participant-jurors viewed jailhouse informants as more
persuasive than both eyewitness and character testimonies, and nearly as persuasive as
primary confessions.
Researchers have also investigated how jurors are influenced by jailhouse
informants receiving incentives. Neuschatz et al. (2008) found that participant-jurors who
were presented with information stating that the jailhouse informant received time off of
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his sentence for testifying still had higher conviction rates than the participants who did
not receive any secondary confession testimony. Like the research on primary
confessions, these results can be understood through the FAE. Research suggests that the
mock-jurors attribute the testimony of the secondary confessors to personal
characteristics (i.e., feeling sympathy for the victims) rather than situational factor
(Neuschatz et al., 2008). Based on this, it is possible to understand why mock jurors find
these testimonies persuasive.
Secondary Confessions and Eyewitnesses
To date, only one study has investigated the influence of secondary confessions
on eyewitness testimony. In this study, Erickson et al. (2016) used an experimental
paradigm similar to that of Hasel and Kassin (2006) in which participants witnessed a
confederate steal a laptop and were told they would be part of a simulated crime
investigation that the experimenter was tasked with solving. The experimenter then
presented a target absent photo lineup and instructed the participant to identify the
member who committed the theft. Two days later, the experimenter contacted the
participants and told them that the stolen laptop had been found in the possession of a
student who was also taking part in the simulated crime investigation. Those in the
confirming secondary confession condition were told that this student stated he bought
the laptop from a Ms. Janet Pickett, and Ms. Pickett was the person they identified in the
lineup. Those in the disconfirming secondary confession condition were told that the
student stated he bought the laptop from Ms. Janet Pickett, and Ms. Pickett was not the
person they identified in the lineup. Those in the primary confession condition were told
that a person named Ms. Janet Pickett had confessed, and this was the person they
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identified. And lastly, those in the control condition were told that the student refused to
identify the person who stole the laptop and sold it to him.
The researchers found that those in the disconfirming secondary confession
condition had lower confidence in their identification decision than those in the
confirming primary confession condition, and their retrospective memory reports were
lower than those in the confirming primary and secondary confession conditions. Like the
primary confession testimony in the study done by Hasel and Kassin (2006), the
secondary confessions in this study acted as post-identification feedback.
Upon examining the previous literature, 2 apparent gaps in the research are found.
First, in the previous study on the influence of secondary confessions on eyewitnesses,
Erickson et al. (2016) used an accomplice as their source of secondary confession, so the
influence of jailhouse informants on eyewitnesses is still unknown. Second, although the
study investigated changes in confidence, it did not give participants the chance to
reconsider their identification decisions; therefore it is unknown whether secondary
confessions, like primary confessions, can lead eyewitnesses to change their
identifications. The aim of the current study was to investigate these two areas. To this
end, participants watched a crime video and then made an identification decision from a
photographic lineup. After making their decision, participants rated their confidence and
were presented with jailhouse informant testimony either implicating the individual they
identified or implicating another unspecified member of the lineup. After, participants
rated their confidence again, and were given the chance to change their initial
identification decision. Lastly, participants rated their confidence in their new decision.
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Hypotheses
Based the previous research suggesting primary confessions can lead
eyewitnesses to alter their identification decisions (Hasel & Kassin, 2006), it was
hypothesized that a secondary confession from a jailhouse informant would influence the
rate of identification changes with disconfirming jailhouse informant testimony
increasing these rates. Secondarily, in alignment with previous research suggesting
primary confessions and informant testimony can act as post-identification feedback
(Erickson et al, 2016; Hasel & Kassin, 2006), it was also hypothesized that jailhouse
informant testimony would act as post-identification feedback and influence confidence
ratings with confirming testimony increasing confidence and disconfirming testimony
decreasing confidence.
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CHAPTER II

METHOD

Participants
The Institutional Review Board at The University of Alabama in Huntsville
approved this study, and informed consent was collected from all participants prior to the
start of the study (see Appendix A for the approval letter and Appendix B for the consent
form). The sample (N = 420) consisted of undergraduate students enrolled in introductory
psychology courses at The University of Alabama in Huntsville participating in the study
to receive research participation credit. The data from 52 participants (11.9%) were
removed from the analysis for failing to accurately answer the manipulation checks (50)
or for indicating suspicion about the experimental paradigm (2). This left 368 participants
(M Age = 20.52, SD = 4.39; 62.7% female) of whom 71.6% identified as
Caucasian/White, 16.1% African American, 4% Asian, 3.8% Hispanic, 0.8% American
Indian, 0.8% Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Island and 1.6% indicated Other
Design
The design differed between those who made an initial identification (choosers)
and those who declined to make one (non – choosers). For choosers, a 6 – group
(Feedback: No Feedback – Control, Confirming Confession, Disconfirming Confession,
Disconfirming Denial, Confirming Jailhouse Informant Testimony, Disconfirming
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Jailhouse Informant Testimony) between-participants design was used. For non –
choosers, a 3 – group (Feedback: No Feedback – Control, Confession, Jailhouse
Informant) between – participants design was used. The primary dependent variables of
interest were identification changes, self-reported confidence ratings and retrospective
impressions.
Materials
All stimuli were presented electronically using E – Prime 2.0 software
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburg, PA). A modified police report about a criminal
case involving an armed robbery, a surveillance video of the robbery and a copy of the
photo lineup used by the police were presented.
Police Report. The police report was modified and made into 4 sections that were
shown throughout the experiment. The first section, the basic report (see appendix C),
consists of one paragraph stating that an aggravated robbery occurred at a convenience
store. The report gives the time, date and location of the robbery and a brief description
of the on-duty clerk’s testimony. The report states that the clerk witnessed a white male
enter the store, pick out a six pack of beer and then approach the checkout counter where
he asked for 4 packs of cigarettes and then pulled out a small handgun and demanded the
money from the cash register The next section, the distractor report (see Appendix D), is
written from the perspective of “Officer P.” The distractor report is 1 half-page of text
and consists of information explaining how the police responded to the dispatch call. The
report states that the police arrived on the scene, checked the nearby area for the
perpetrator, received a statement from the on-duty clerk, processed the area for
fingerprints and obtained the surveillance recordings from the store. This report is
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followed by the filler report. The filler report (see Appendix E) is one paragraph and is
written from the perspective of “Officer C.” The report states that Officer C. arrived on
the scene, pulled five latent fingerprints from various areas of the store, spoke with the
manager and received the surveillance footage from the interior cameras. The final report
is written from the perspective of “Officer G.” There are four versions of this report (see
Appendix F-I). In the confession, denial and control versions, Officer G. states that a man
named Kenneth C. was interviewed at the police station about the robbery. In the
confession version, the officer goes on to say that Kenneth C. confessed to the crime. In
the denial version, the officer goes on to say that Kenneth C. denied being involved in the
crime, and in the control version, no further information is given about what occurred
during the interview. In the fourth version, the informant testimony version, Officer G.
states that a man named Samuel F. was interviewed at the police station. The officer goes
on to say that Samuel F. stated that a man named Kenneth C. admitted to committing the
crime while the two were together in a police holding area.
Surveillance video. The surveillance video is the actual surveillance video
retrieved from the store that was robbed. The video is 2 minutes long and shows an
overhead view of the checkout counter. In the video, a white male wearing a baseball hat
approaches the counter with a six-pack of beer, briefly speaks to the cashier, pulls out a
small handgun and points it at the cashier. The cashier opens the cash register and puts
the money, beer and 4 packs of cigarettes into a bag and hands the bag to the man. The
man is then shown exiting the store. A partial view of the man’s face (i.e. his chin, mouth
and right cheek) is visible throughout the video, but his entire face is only visible for 1.5
seconds.
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Photo lineup. The photo lineup is the actual photo lineup constructed by the
police in the case of the State of Tennessee vs. Kenneth Chandler. All members of the
lineup match the physical description of the culprit given by the cashier (i.e., white male,
reddish brown hair, short beard). There are 2 versions of the lineup: the exact version the
police presented to the cashier in which the target is in position 5 (version 1), and the
edited version in which the suspect was moved from position 5 to position 3 (version 2).
The second version was made to determine if target placement would influence the rate
of identification change or accuracy. There were no other differences between the two
versions (see appendix J and K).
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were told that they would be participating in a jury
decision-making study and were directed to a computer with the Eprime program. After
giving informed consent, participants were instructed to read all material and to pay close
attention to the tasks presented. The basic report was presented and then the surveillance
video of the robbery was played. After, participants read the distractor report for 3
minutes. One of the two versions of the lineup was presented based on random
assignment and participants were asked to make an identification decision. Unbiased
instructions were given in which participants read that they had the option of not
identifying any member of the lineup. After completing the identification task
participants rated their confidence in that decision on a 7-point Likert scale in which 1
represented ‘not at all confident’ and 7 represented ‘very confident’. The filler report was
then presented and participants read that the police began interviewing residents of the
area in hopes of obtaining more information about the crime. The text went on to explain
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that one of the individuals interviewed was a man named Kenneth C. and that this man
was brought into the police station, put into a holding area and was then interviewed by
the police. At this point, the text differed depending on the feedback condition and
whether the participants were choosers or non – choosers.
For choosers, participants in both confession conditions read that Kenneth C.
confessed to the crime; participants in the disconfirming denial condition read that
Kenneth C. denied committing the crime, and those in the no feedback – control
condition and both jailhouse informant conditions were given no more information about
what happened during the interview. For participants in both jailhouse informant
conditions, the text indicated that a later interview took place in which a man told police
that Kenneth C. confessed to the crime while the two were together in the police holding
area. After reading this material, all participants except those in the no – feedback control
condition read that either Kenneth C. was the man they identified in the lineup
(confirming confession, disconfirming denial, confirming jailhouse informant testimony)
or that Kenneth C. was present in the lineup but was not the man they identified
(disconfirming confession, disconfirming jailhouse informant testimony).
The procedure for non-choosers differed from that of choosers in one primary
way. Instead of reading that Kenneth C. was the man they identified in the lineup or that
he was in the lineup but not the identified individual, participants in the confession and
jailhouse informant condition were simply told that Kenneth C. was a member of the
lineup that had previously been shown.
After these texts were presented, the procedure for choosers and non-choosers
was the same. The final report that corresponded to the participants’ conditions was
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presented. Next, participants were asked to rate their confidence in their previous
identification decision on a 7-point Likert scale. After, they were presented with another
copy of the same lineup they had previously seen and were asked to make an
identification decision. Participants read that they could change their previous
identification decision or keep it the same if they felt their initial decision was correct.
Like the first lineup, participants were given unbiased instructions. After making their
decision, participants were asked to rate their confidence in their new identification
decision (regardless of if they changed their decision or not). Overall, in this procedure
participants gave three confidence ratings. The first rating was in regards to their initial
identification decision, the second rating was in regards to their initial identification
decision but only after receiving feedback and the third rating was in regards to their
second identification decision. After giving the third confidence rating, participants were
presented with the retrospective impression questionnaire. This questionnaire asked
participants on 7-point Likert scales how good of a view they had of the culprit’s face,
how much attention they paid to the culprit’s face, how willing they would be to testify in
court that the person they identified was the culprit and how trustworthy they believe an
eyewitness would be if he or she had about the same view of the culprit as they did (see
appendix L for a copy of the retrospective impression questionnaire). Manipulation
checks were then presented asking the participants (1) if they identified someone in the
first lineup, (2) if they identified someone in the second lineup, and (3) what occurred
during the police interview. The first two questions had yes/no answers and the latter was
a multiple-choice with only one correct answer per condition. After answering the
manipulation checks, participants answered a demand characteristic question asking if
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they felt the researcher wanted them to respond in a certain way to one or more of the
tasks presented during the study. Lastly, the study ended with a demographic
questionnaire and debriefing.
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CHAPTER III

RESULTS

In order to evaluate the hypotheses on jailhouse informant testimony influencing
identification and confidence changes, I first had to ensure that participants read the
material they were presented with. To test this, participants were asked to respond to
three manipulation checks. The first of these questions asked participants if they
identified a member of the first lineup, the second asked them if they identified a member
of the second lineup, and the third asked them what occurred during the police interview.
Participants’ data were removed from the analyses if they incorrectly answered both the
first and second manipulation check and/or if they incorrectly answered the third
manipulation check. Overall 50 participants (11.9%) from the total 420 participants were
removed for failing to correctly respond to the manipulation check questions. Thirty-two
of the 50 participants removed for this failure were in 1 of the 3 jailhouse informant
conditions; therefore, participant removal was not evenly distributed across conditions.
This unequal distribution was due to a greater proportion of those in the jailhouse
informant conditions answering the third question incorrectly; that a confession occurred
during the police interview rather than an informant testimony.
In addition to the manipulation checks, all participants responded to a demand
characteristic question, which asked participants if they felt the researcher wanted them
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to respond in a certain way to one or more of the tasks presented during the study. Four –
hundred and eighteen of the 420 participants answered no to this question, and two
participants, both of which were non – choosers, answered that they believed the
researchers presented them with false testimony to persuade them to identify a member of
the second lineup. These two participants data were removed from the analyses because
they had accurate suspicions about the purpose of the manipulated feedback. After
removal, there were 368 remaining participants for analysis.
The suspect position in the lineup did not affect the rate of identification change,
X2 (1, N = 368) = 0.33, p = .566, or the accuracy X2 (1, N = 368) = 0.13, p = .718. Thus,
the rest of the analyses are collapsed over suspect position.
Identifications
One hundred and fifty–five participants (42.12%) identified one of the members
of the first lineup (choosers), whereas 213 participants (57.88%) made no identification
(non-choosers). The rate of accuracy within these two groups is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Proportion of accurate identifications of the target.
Accuracy
Choice

Lineup 1

Lineup 2

Choosers

.32 (50)

.28 (43)

.00 (0)

.12 (25)

Non – Choosers

Note: numbers in parentheses indicate the actual number of participants who accurately identified
the target.
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Choosers. As can be seen in Table 2, among choosers, the highest rate of
identification changes occurred in the disconfirming jailhouse informant and confession
conditions. As predicted, the rate of identification changes was significantly influenced
by feedback, χ2(5, N = 155) = 44.365, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .535. To test the hypothesis
that disconfirming testimony would lead choosers to change their initial identification,
planned follow-up pair wise χ2 were conducted. As hypothesized, the rate of
identification changes in the disconfirming jailhouse informant condition was
significantly higher than the rate in the no – feedback control condition, χ2(1, N = 50) =
18, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .6, as was the rate in the disconfirming confession condition,
χ2(1, N = 47) = 9.252, p = .002, Cramer’s V = .444. The rate of identification changes in
these two disconfirming conditions was not significantly different, χ2(1, N = 47) = 1.566,
p = .211. Additionally, odds ratios indicated that those in the disconfirming jailhouse
informant condition were 16 times more likely to change their identification than those in
the control condition. Likewise, those in the disconfirming confession condition were 7
times more likely to change their identification than those in the control condition.
Comparisons between all chooser conditions can be seen in Table 2.
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Table 2. Proportions of identification changes between feedback conditions.
ID Change
Condition

Choosers

Non – Choosers

Confirming Confession

.07a

N/A

Confirming Informant

.21a

N/A

Disconfirming Confession

.64bc

N/A

Disconfirming Denial

.30ac

N/A

Disconfirming Informant

.80b

N/A

No – Feedback Control

.20a

.38b

Confession

N/A

.67a

Informant

N/A

.52ab

Note: proportions not sharing a common subscript within column differ at p ≤ .01

	
  
	
  
It may be the case that participants who made accurate identifications at lineup 1
were less influenced by the feedback because they had a stronger memory trace of the
perpetrator. To test this possibility, a χ2 test was conducted on accuracy at lineup 1 and
the rate of identification changes. This analyses was not significant (χ2(1, N = 155) =
1.369, p = .242) indicating that, collapsed across feedback conditions, participants who
were accurate at lineup 1 were as likely to change their identification as were the
choosers who were inaccurate. Table 3 shows the proportion of initially accurate and
inaccurate choosers who changed their identification within each feedback group.
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Table 3. Proportions of identification changes for initially accurate and inaccurate choosers.
	
  
ID Change
Condition

Accurate

Inaccurate

Confirming Confession

.13 (1)

.05 (1)

Confirming Informant

.10 (1)

.26 (6)

Disconfirming Confession

.50 (4)

.71 (10)

Disconfirming Denial

.50 (4)

.20 (3)

Disconfirming Informant

.80 (8)

.80 (12)

No – Feedback Control

.50 (3)

.11 (2)

Total

.42 (21)

.32 (34)

Note: numbers in parentheses indicate the actual number of participants who changed their
identification.

Non-Choosers. As can be seen in Table 2, among non-choosers, 66.7% of those
in the confession condition identified one of the members of the second lineup compared
to 51.5% in the jailhouse informant condition and 38.1% in the no – feedback control
condition. As was the case for the choosers, an omnibus χ2 analysis and follow-up
planned pairwise comparisons were conducted on the rate of identification changes (i.e.,
choosing a person in the lineup after initially declining to do so). Once again there was a
significant effect of feedback on identification change, X2(2, N = 213) = 11.968, p = .003,
Cramer’s V = .237. The rate of identification changes in the confession condition was
significantly higher than the rate in the no – feedback control condition, χ2(1, N = 147) =
11.848, p = .001, Cramer’s V = .284, but did not differ significantly from the jailhouse
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informant condition, χ2(1, N = 150) = 3.535, p = .06. The rate of identification changes in
the jailhouse informant condition, although in the predicted direction, did not
significantly differ from the rate in the no – feedback control condition, χ2(1, N = 129) =
2.346, p = .126. Odds ratio indicated that those in the jailhouse informant condition were
1.73 times more likely to change their identification than those in the no feedback –
control condition, whereas those in the confession condition were 3.25 times more likely
to make a change.
Confidence
Choosers: To test the hypotheses that confirming jailhouse informant testimony
would increase confidence and disconfirming jailhouse informant testimony would
decrease confidence, a 6 (Feedback: No feedback – control, Confirming confession,
Confirming jailhouse informant testimony, Disconfirming confession, Disconfirming
denial, Disconfirming jailhouse informant testimony,) X 3 (Time: Time 1, Time 2, Time
3) two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the mean confidence
ratings. This analysis revealed significant main effects of Time, F(2, 298) = 4.514, p =
.012, ηp2= .029, and Feedback, F(5,149) = 5.056, p < .001, ηp2 = .145. Most importantly,
there was also a significant interaction between Time and Feedback, F(10, 298) = 7.696,
p < .001, ηp2 = .205.
To further explore this interaction, separate repeated measures ANOVAs were
conducted on mean confidence ratings across time for all feedback conditions. For the
confirming jailhouse informant condition, a significant difference in confidence was
found across time, F(2, 64) = 8.279, p = .001, ηp2 = .206. As hypothesized, the
participants in the confirming jailhouse informant condition had a significant increase in
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confidence from time 1 (M = 3.76, SD = 1.06) to time 2 (M = 4.48, SD = 1.35), M
difference = .727, SE = .176, p = .001. Additionally, these participants had significantly
higher confidence at time 3 (M = 4.3, SD = 1.1) than at time 1, M difference = .545, SE =
.169, p = .009. For the confirming confession condition, a significant difference in
confidence was also found across time, F(2, 52) = 10.127, p < .001, ηp2= .28. Like the
participants in the confirming jailhouse informant condition, the participants in the
confirming confession condition had a significant increase in confidence from time 1 (M
= 4.15, SD = 1.32) to time 2 (M = 5.33, SD = 0.96), M difference = 1.185, SE = .293, p =
.001, but, unlike those in the confirming jailhouse informant condition, they had a
significant decrease in confidence from time 2 to time 3 (M = 4.67, SD = 1.41), M
difference = .667, SE = .25, p = .039. However, this decrease in confidence was due to
two participants who, unlike all other participants in the condition, changed their
identification after receiving the confirming confession feedback. When both of these
choosers’ data were removed from the analysis, there was no significant decrease found
in confidence from time 2 (M = 5.32, SD = 0.99) to time 3 (M = 4.88, SD = 1.2), M
difference = .44, SE = .192, p = .093.
For the disconfirming jailhouse informant condition, a significant difference in
confidence was also found across time, albeit in the opposite direction, F(2, 48) = 12.1, p
< .001, ηp2 =.335. As hypothesized, the participants in the disconfirming jailhouse
informant condition had a significant decrease in confidence from time 1 (M = 3.72, SD =
1.37) to time 2 (M = 2.64, SD = 1.25), M difference = 1.08, SE = .282, p = .002.
Additionally, the participants in the disconfirming jailhouse informant condition had a
significant increase in confidence from time 2 to time 3 (M = 3.72, SD = 1.10), M
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difference = 1.08, SE = .258, p = .001. Unlike the disconfirming jailhouse informant
condition, no significant difference in confidence was found across time for the
disconfirming confession condition, F(2,42) = 0.954, p = .394. Additionally, no
significant differences in confidence were found across time for the no – feedback control
condition, F(2, 48) = 2.0, p = .146, or the disconfirming denial condition, F(2, 44) =
1.975, p = .151. The means and standard deviations for choosers’ confidence can be seen
in Table 4.

Table 4. Choosers’ mean confidence.
Confidence
Condition

Time 1

Time 2

Time 3

Confirming Confession

4.15 (1.32)

5.33 (0.96)

4.67 (1.41)

Confirming Informant

3.76 (1.06)

4.48 (1.35)

4.30 (1.10)

Disconfirming Confession

3.77 (1.15)

3.5 (1.26)

3.82 (0.91)

Disconfirming Denial

3.96 (1.07)

4.22 (1.13)

4.22 (1.17)

Disconfirming Informant

3.72 (1.37)

2.64 (1.25)

3.72 (1.10)

No – Feedback Control

4.00 (1.32)

4.00 (1.32)

4.20 (1.35)

Note: numbers in parentheses indicate the standard deviation.
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Non – choosers: Similar to what was done for choosers, a 3(Feedback: No –
feedback control, Confession, Jailhouse informant testimony) X 3 (Time: Time 1, Time
2, Time 3) two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the mean
confidence ratings for non – choosers. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of
Time, F(1.704, 357.918) = 27.106, p < .001, ηp2 = .114, and a significant interaction
between Time and Feedback, F(3.409, 357.918) = 7.316, p < .001, ηp2 = .065.
As was done for the choosers’ data, separate repeated measures ANOVAs were
conducted on mean confidence ratings across time for the 3 non – chooser conditions. For
the jailhouse informant condition, a significant difference in confidence was found across
time, F(1.803, 117.216) = 16.118, p < .001, ηp2 = .199. As hypothesized, the participants
in the jailhouse informant condition had a significant decrease in confidence from time 1
(M = 4.3, SD = 1.41) to time 2 (M = 3.47, SD = 1.69), M difference = 0.833, SE = .144, p
< .001, and a significant increase in confidence from time 2 to time 3 (M = 4.18, SD =
1.36), M difference = .712, SE = .183, p = .001. Like the jailhouse informant condition, a
significant difference in confidence was found in the confession condition across time,
F(1.427, 118.408) = 22.921, p < .001, ηp2 = .216. As was the case for the participants in
the jailhouse informant condition, the participants in the confession condition had a
significant decrease in confidence from time 1 (M = 4.37, SD = 1.32) to time 2 (M = 3.29,
SD = 2.0), M difference = 1.083, SE = .187, p < .001, and a significant increase in
confidence from time 2 to time 3 (M = 4.25, SD = 1.34), M difference = .964, SE = .213,
p < .001. There was no significant difference in confidence across time for the no –
feedback control condition, F(1.315, 81.546) = .127, p = .791. The means and standard
deviations for non – choosers’ confidence can be seen in Table 5.
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Table 5. Non – choosers’ mean confidence.
Confidence
Condition

Time 1

Time 2

Time 3

Confession

4.37 (1.32)

3.29 (2.0)

4.25 (1.34)

Informant

4.30 (1.41)

3.47 (1.69)

4.18 (1.36)

No – Feed Control

4.34 (1.48)

4.37 (1.5)

4.32 (1.27)

Note: numbers in parentheses indicate the standard deviation.

Retrospective Impressions
To assess if differences existed between feedback conditions on self – reported
ratings of attention, view, willingness to testify and trustworthiness, a multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted for both choosers and non – choosers.
For non – choosers, no significant differences on any of the four measures were found
between conditions, F(8, 414) = 1.021, p = .419. Likewise, no significant differences on
any of the measures were found among the choosers’ conditions, F(20, 485.177) = 1.297,
p = .175.
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CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The aim of the current study was to investigate the influence of jailhouse
informant testimony on eyewitnesses’ identification decisions and confidence. As for
those who made an initial identification (choosers), it was hypothesized that
disconfirming jailhouse informant testimony (i.e., testimony implicating an unidentified
lineup member) would decrease eyewitnesses’ confidence in their initial identification
and would then lead them to identify a different individual. In contrast, it was
hypothesized that confirming jailhouse informant testimony (i.e., testimony implicating
the identified lineup member) would increase eyewitnesses’ confidence in their initial
identification. As for those who declined to make an initial identification (non –
choosers), it was hypothesized that jailhouse informant testimony implicating an
unspecified lineup member would decrease non – choosers’ confidence in their lack of
identification and would then lead them to identify a lineup member when given the
chance.
As hypothesized, disconfirming jailhouse informant testimony significantly
decreased participants’ confidence in their initial identification and significantly
increased the rate of identification changes. Participants in that condition were 16 times
more likely to change their identification than those in the no – feedback control
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condition. These participants also had a significant increase in confidence after 80% of
them identified a different individual. This confidence increase in the new identification
suggests they truly came to believe the newly identified individual was the perpetrator
from the video. Conversely, as hypothesized, the confirming jailhouse informant
testimony significantly increased participants’ confidence in their initial identification
and led to a significantly lower rate of identification changes. Lastly, among non –
choosers, the jailhouse informant testimony implicating an unspecified lineup member
significantly decreased participants’ confidence in their lack of identification and, after
52% went on to identify a lineup member, there was a significant increase in confidence.
As was the case for those in the disconfirming jailhouse informant condition, this
increase in confidence suggests these participants came to believe their identification was
the correct decision.
Although the jailhouse informant testimony influenced non – choosers
confidence, the rate of identifications in this condition was not significantly higher than
the rate in the non – choosers no – feedback control condition. This finding was contrary
to what was hypothesized and suggests that non – choosers are not as influenced by
jailhouse informant testimony as are choosers. However, it was not the rate of
identifications in the jailhouse informant condition that was surprisingly low, but rather it
was the rate in the no – feedback control condition that was surprisingly high. Thirty –
eight percent of non – choosers who did not receive any feedback went on to identify a
lineup member. This finding suggests that simply presenting a lineup a second time to an
individual who initially declined to make an identification is a non – verbal suggestion
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that may lead the eyewitness to identify someone. However, further research is necessary
to test this possibility.
The current results aligned with previous research on primary confessions.
Replicating Hasel and Kassin (2012), we found that disconfirming confessions led
participants to change their identification at a significantly higher rate than the no –
feedback control condition. Furthermore, disconfirming confessions decreased
participants’ confidence in their initial identification, whereas confirming confessions
increased participants’ confidence in their initial identification. However, in the current
study, the confidence decrease in the disconfirming confession condition was not
significant. This may have been due to a lack of statistical power as this condition had the
lowest amount of participants (n = 22). Lastly, similar to Hasel and Kassin (2012) I found
that confession evidence presented to non – choosers significantly decreased their
confidence in their declination and significantly increased their rate of identifications
with 67% identifying a lineup member when given the chance. As was the case for non –
choosers in the jailhouse informant condition, non – choosers in the confession condition
had a significant increase in confidence after the majority identified a lineup member,
indicating that these participants came to believe their identification was correct.
The current study not only replicates and extends past research, but it also relates
to current theoretical models. The Selective Cue Integration Framework (Charman et al.,
2010) is a model used to understand how eyewitnesses assess their confidence. The
Selective Cue Integration Framework states that eyewitnesses will use post –
identification feedback to help determine their confidence if their internal memory cues
are weak and no information is found undermining the credibility of the feedback. In the
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current study, both disconfirming and confirming jailhouse informant testimony was
found to manipulate confidence in the predicted direction, therefore acting as post –
identification feedback. Based on the Selective Cue Integration Framework, these
findings suggest something very important: many participants in the current study did not
find the jailhouse informant testimony incredible, for, if they did, the testimony would
not have been used to assess confidence.
Future Research and Limitations
Like most experimental studies, the generalizability of the results is a question of
interest. Based on the Selective Cue Integration Framework (Charman et al., 2010),
eyewitnesses who have strong internal cues will not be influenced by external feedback
like the jailhouse informant testimony used in this study. Therefore, one should be
hesitant to generalize the findings to eyewitnesses who have stronger internal cues than
the participant – eyewitnesses used in this study. One area for future research would be to
investigate the boundary conditions of the current findings by attempting to manipulate
the strength of internal cues by assigning different exposure times to see at what levels
the current findings can and cannot be replicated.
Another question for future research regards the credibility of jailhouse
informants. Future research should investigate what aspects of jailhouse informant
testimony influence its perceived credibility. Some of these potential variables could be
the amount of collaborated details contained in an informant’s testimony, the method
used to obtain relevant crime details (i.e., from the suspect or from another source), or the
extent to which the jailhouse informant is cross examined. This line of research is
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important to help us gain a better theoretical understanding as to why this type of
testimony is persuasive.
Conclusion
The use of jailhouse informants has led to an alarmingly high number of wrongful
convictions (Innocence Project, 2016). This finding can be better understood when
considering the position of jailhouse informants. Many of these individuals, while acting
as informants, are awaiting trial or have pending charges against them. They are,
therefore, highly motivated to please authorities and may become incentivized to commit
perjury (Giglio v. United States, 1972). In spite of this reality, jailhouse informants are
influential witnesses (Wetmore et al. 2014), and this holds true even when jurors are
made aware that the informant received an incentive for testifying (Neuschatz et al.,
2008). Although some researchers have investigated the influence of jailhouse informants
on jurors, this was the first study to investigate how jailhouse informants influence
eyewitnesses, and the results are troubling. The findings suggest that jailhouse informant
testimony is so influential it can lead eyewitnesses to identify an entirely different
individual.

32

APPENDIX A

!
!
!
March 20, 2016
Mr. Preston Smith
Graduate Student
Psychology Department
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Dear Mr. Smith,
The UAH Institutional Review Board of Human Subjects Committee has reviewed your
proposal, Jury Decision-Making, and found it meets the necessary criteria for continued
approval. Your proposal seems to be in compliance with this institutions Federal Wide
Assurance (FWA) 00019998 and the DHHS Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects
(45 CFR 46).
Please note that this approval is good for one year from the date on this letter. If data
collection continues past this period, you are responsible for processing a renewal application a
minimum of 60 days prior to the expiration date.
No changes are to be made to the approved protocol without prior review and approval
from the UAH IRB. All changes (e.g. a change in procedure, number of subjects, personnel,
study locations, new recruitment materials, study instruments, etc) must be prospectively
reviewed and approved by the IRB before they are implemented. You should report any
unanticipated problems involving risks to the participants or others to the IRB Chair.
If you have any questions regarding the IRB’s decision, please contact me.

Sincerely,

William Wilkerson
IRB Chair
Dean, Honors College

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH
Von Braun Research Hall M-17
Huntsville, AL 35899
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APPENDIX B

Consent Form: Jury Decision-Making
You are invited to participate in a research study about jury decision-making. This study is
designed to help us to better understand how jurors view evidence used in criminal cases. The
primary investigator is Preston Smith.
REQUIREMENTS OF PARTICIPATION: You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this
study.
PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE STUDY: Once written consent is given, you will
be asked to view information about a criminal case, including a short video of the crime and to
make judgments about that information. This session will take 1 half hour to complete.
DISCOMFORTS AND RISKS FROM PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY: There are no
expected risks associated with your participation. The video you will be presented in the study is
within expectations of those found on popular media.
INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATION: You will receive 1 activity point on SONA for your
participation.
EXPECTED BENEFITS: There are no direct benefits to you. However, you may gain some firsthand experience with psychological research and this may be considered a benefit.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RESULTS: Participant numbers will be used to record your data, and
these numbers will be made available only to those researchers directly involved with this study,
thereby ensuring strict confidentiality. This consent form will be destroyed within 3 years. The
data from your session will only be released to those individuals who are directly involved in the
research and only using your participant number.
FREEDOM TO WITHDRAW: You are free to withdraw from the study at any time. You will
not be penalized in any form if you choose to withdrawal. Investigators reserve the right to
remove any participant from the session without regard to the participant’s consent.
CONTACT INFORMATION: If any questions should arise about this study, you may contact the
Principal Investigator, Preston Smith (ps0065@uah.edu), or the supervising faculty, Dr. Jeffrey
Neuschatz (neuschaj@uah.edu), at any point in the research process. If you have questions about
your rights as a research participant or concerns or complaints about the research, you may
contact the UAH Office of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 256.824.6101 or email Dr.
William Wilkerson at irb.@uah.edu.
If you agree to participate in our research on a strictly voluntary basis, please sign and date
below. A copy of this consent form is for your records.
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at UAH and will expire in one year
from March 20, 2016.
_______________________________________________________________________
Name (Please Print)
Signature
Date
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APPENDIX C
NARRATIVE	
  
	
  
	
  
On July 20, 2013, Offense Report 13-18603 was filed at approximately 9:46 P.M.
regarding an Aggravated Robbery at Exxon located at 1300 Germantown Road,
Germantown, Shelby County, Tennessee. Diane F. who is the cashier at Exxon
stated a white male subject entered the business, entered the beer cooler and
took 6 sixteen ounce cans of Budweiser to the checkout counter; he then asked
the clerk for two packs of Camel wide cigarettes and two packs of LM Red 100’s.
The subject then displayed a small silver handgun and demanded Diane F. place
the beer, cigarettes and the money from the cash register in a white plastic
Exxon bag. The suspect then exited the store with approximately $225.00 cash
and the merchandise. 	
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APPENDIX D
Narrative 7/23/2013 8:03 AM 	
  
	
  
On Saturday July 20, 2013 at approximately 2147 hours, I, Officer P., received a
call from dispatch to Exxon located at 1300 Germantown Road in regards to an
armed robbery. Dispatch advised that the subject was a white male. Officer H.
and I made the scene at 2148 hours and checked Wolf River Blvd to the west city
limits with negative contact. I arrived back at the Exxon at 2152 hours and spoke
with the on duty clerk, Diane F. Ms. F. stated that at approximately 2142 hours, a
white male subject entered the store and proceeded to the cooler where he got a
six pack of Budweiser beer and went the checkout counter. While at the checkout
counter, the subject asked for two packs of Camel wide cigarettes and two packs
of red L&M cigarettes. When asked for identification, the subject then reached
into his back right pocket and pulled out a small silver handgun. He pointed it at
the clerk and said, “Open up the till.” She opened the cash register and put
approximately $150.00 cash along with the beer and 4 packs of cigarettes in a
white plastic bag. The subject then tried exiting through the north door but it was
locked, so he then exited through the south door. Ms. F. advised that she saw
the subject walk northward along the west side of the building but then lost sight
of him. Ms. F. then locked the door, went behind the counter and called 911. 	
  
	
  
Officers arrived in the area to search for the subject. Officers spoke with an
employee of the nearby Taco Bell and an employee of the nearby Homewood
Suites, both of whom said they did not see a subject matching the description. 	
  
	
  
Officer C. arrived on scene and processed the area for fingerprints. He was able
to lift five fingerprints from areas the suspect was observed touching on the
surveillance video. The fingerprint cards were placed into evidence. 	
  
	
  
Detective C. made the scene and obtained the surveillance recordings as well as
the clerks statement.	
  
	
  
The total loss of property to Exxon was approximately $180.00 dollars. 	
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APPENDIX E
Narrative 7/23/2013 8:03 AM 	
  
	
  
	
  
On July 20, 2013, at approximately 2156 hours, I, Officer C., arrived at 1300 S
Germantown Rd, Exxon, to conduct a crime scene investigation in regards to a
Robbery complaint. Officers H. and P. were on the scene when I arrived. 	
  
	
  
Upon entering Exxon, I observed that the south entrance was unlocked, the north
entrance was locked, and that the store had several cameras inside. I was able
to lift 5 latent prints of possible interest, 2 from the south door handle, 2 from the
third cooler door from the north wall, and 1 from the counter in front of the north
register. 	
  
	
  
I spoke with the manager Careshia E. (901-XXX-XXXX) and received the
surveillance footage from all interior cameras. 	
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APPENDIX F

Narrative 8/07/2013 8:10 AM	
  
	
  
On Tuesday, August 6, 2013, I, Detective G., interviewed Kenneth C. at the
Germantown Police Department about the armed robbery of the Exxon store
located at 1300 Germantown Road on 7/20/2013. During the interview, Kenneth
C. confessed to the committing the robbery. An audio recording of Kenneth C.’s
testimony, including his confession, was placed into evidence. 	
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APPENDIX G
Narrative 8/07/2013 8:10 AM	
  
	
  
On Tuesday, August 6, 2013, I, Detective G., interviewed Kenneth C. at the
Germantown Police Department about the armed robbery of the Exxon store
located at 1300 Germantown Road on 7/20/2013. During the interview, Kenneth
C. denied being involved in the robbery. An audio recording of Kenneth C.’s
testimony was placed into evidence. 	
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APPENDIX H

Narrative 8/07/2013 8:10 AM	
  
	
  
On Tuesday, August 6, 2013, I, Detective G., interviewed Kenneth C. at the
Germantown Police Department about the armed robbery of the Exxon store
located at 1300 Germantown Road on 7/20/2013. An audio recording of Kenneth
C.’s testimony was placed into evidence. 	
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APPENDIX I

Narrative 8/07/2013 8:10 AM	
  
	
  
On Tuesday, August 6, 2013, I, Detective G., interviewed Samuel F. at the
Germantown Police Department about the armed robbery of the Exxon store
located at 1300 Germantown Road on 7/20/2013. Samuel F. stated that while he
and Kenneth C. were together in the Germantown Police Department holding
area (M-5), Kenneth C. confessed to committing the robbery. An audio recording
of Samuels F.’s testimony was placed into evidence. 	
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APPENDIX J
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APPENDIX K
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APPENDIX L

Please	
  indicate,	
  on	
  a	
  scale	
  from	
  1-‐7,	
  how	
  good	
  of	
  a	
  view	
  you	
  had	
  of	
  the	
  culprit’s	
  face.	
  
1	
  (Very	
  poor)	
  	
  
2	
  	
  
3	
  	
  
4	
  	
  
5	
  	
  
6	
  	
  
7	
  (Very	
  good)	
  
Please	
  indicate,	
  on	
  a	
  scale	
  from	
  1-‐7,	
  how	
  much	
  attention	
  you	
  were	
  paying	
  to	
  the	
  
culprit’s	
  face	
  while	
  viewing	
  the	
  video.	
  
1	
  (Very	
  poor)	
  
2	
  	
  
3	
  
4	
  
5	
  
6	
  
7	
  (Very	
  good)	
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On	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  your	
  memory	
  of	
  the	
  culprit,	
  please	
  indicate,	
  on	
  a	
  1-‐7	
  scale,	
  how	
  willing	
  
would	
  you	
  be	
  to	
  testify	
  in	
  court	
  that	
  the	
  person	
  you	
  identified	
  was	
  the	
  culprit	
  in	
  the	
  video.	
  
1	
  (Not	
  at	
  all	
  willing)	
  
2	
  
3	
  
4	
  
5	
  
6	
  
7	
  (Totally	
  willing)	
  
Assume	
  that	
  an	
  eyewitness	
  had	
  about	
  the	
  same	
  view	
  of	
  the	
  culprit	
  as	
  you	
  had	
  from	
  
watching	
  the	
  video.	
  Do	
  you	
  think	
  that	
  an	
  identification	
  from	
  this	
  witness	
  ought	
  to	
  be	
  
trusted?	
  
1	
  (Definitely	
  should	
  not	
  be	
  trusted)	
  
2	
  
3	
  
4	
  
5	
  
6	
  
7	
  (Definitely	
  should	
  be	
  trusted)	
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